The City College CUNY Class: PHIL 31300 Free Will

Prof. Benjamin Vilhauer

With lots of talk about God. Perhaps this is the most interesting class for this term.

I find that http://www.informationphilosopher.com is very helpful in this course, and possibly all other philosophy courses.

Some of the entries will contain Ligioner's "Understanding Free Will" by Sproul.

 

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23 Responses to The City College CUNY Class: PHIL 31300 Free Will

  1. timlyg says:

    John Stuart Mill - Utilitarianism
    Prof:
    "Greatest happiness for the greatest number"
    "The end justifies the means"
    Keep in mind that the end is a pretty good one, though - increasing happiness as much as you can for all humanity!
    Questions:
    1. Are there people who shouldn't be happy? (Deserve)
    2. Are there things we just shouldn't do, even if they increase overall happiness? (Human Rights)

    Reference to Mahayana's Bodhisattva was made to support utilitarianism (self-sacrifice for greater good) when a student used Buddhism as a mistaken attack on utilitarian's pleasure. Utilitarian's pleasure favors intellectual more than sensual.

    My take:
    If no pain, how does one conceive gratification?

  2. timlyg says:

    09/03/2015
    Kant's work on Moral
    Prof:
    Mill vs. Kant
    Maximization of overall happiness vs. Categorical Imperative

  3. timlyg says:

    09/08/2015
    Prof:
    Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism
    Determinism & Free will are compatible vs. not compatible

    Laws of nature - causality, what happens.

    Determinism:
    A). All the facts about the laws of nature
    B). All the facts about the world at one instant entail or imply.
    implies...
    C). All the facts about the world at all instants.

    Student: If all is predestined (determinism) why debate with compatibilists?
    I would reply: Because one is not sure that compatibilists are predetermined to be compatibilists.

    Compatibilism: Crazy in a way that even there's no wiggle room in determinism, free will is always possible.

    Determinism vs. Fatalism
    Fatalism: no plan, no destiny.
    From Podcast (In Our Times Philosophy: Free Will):
    Fatalism says it happens no matter what you do, almost like the working of Fate of the Greek Mythology.
    Determinism says it happens through whatever's in the process of the happening.

  4. timlyg says:

    09/17/2015
    Incompatibilism: Free will/Moral Responsibility is not compatible with determinism.
    Libertarianism: Incompatibilism and rejects determinism.
    Hard Determinists: Incompatibilism and rejects Free Will/Moral Responsibility.

    From wiki:
    Determinism vs. Free Will Terminology

    Prof: Determinism has been common until philosophers wanted to assign moral responsibility.

    Chisholm: Incompatibilism & Libertarianism. Hence, he thinks determinism is false.

  5. timlyg says:

    09/24/2015
    Very interesting survey from Knobe and Nichols' Moral Responsibility and Determinism.
    I can use this as a teaching tool. This brings to mind of infralapsarianism vs. supralapsarianism.

    Prof's note: 3 explanations
    Performance Error: determinists carried away by emotions (incompatibilism)
    Affective (emotional) Competence: (compatibilism)
    Concrete Competence: get Details (less likely to be correct)

    I asked if Compatibilism is Kantian (Categorical Imperative).
    Prof.: could be: Kantian or "Virtue Ethicists".

    Though a hard determinist, Vilhauer attempts to openly discuss all views.

    The class is given partial survey and it appears that the divide is mainly between incompatibilists (specifically hard determinism & libertarianism). I wonder, would most youngsters today deal with morality in a utilitarianism way?

    Prof.'s list of compatibilists/incompatibilists on campus:
    Compatibilists:
    Morton
    Pappas (Nietzschean, possibly)
    Ritchie

    Incompatibilists:
    Blustein
    Vilhauer
    Marinoff (possibly)

    That's all I could remember of the list.

    The modern philosophy class and this class have helped me see much of liberalism today at a closer level. Definitely can't find myself sleeping in these classes.

  6. timlyg says:

    09/25/2015
    Quantum Mechanics
    Prof.'s note:
    1. Indeterminism (Ontological & Orthodox):
    ___Objections:
    _____A: Many Worlds
    _____B: Bohm (We don't know enough to say it's random, epistemological (Prof. says this is Bohm's stand) vs. ontological indeterminacy = in one of the states vs. not in any states)
    2. Observer Participation
    3. Nonlocality

    Terms mentioned: Collapse eigenstate, panpsychism.

  7. timlyg says:

    09/29/2015
    Prof's note:
    Chisholm: "Event Causation" - explaining things based on what happened before.
    Chisholm: "Agent-Causation" - >Quantum indeterminacy: (Outside time for Kant, in time for Descartes).
    Nietzsche: full determinism.

    Paper #1 keys:
    Use Zeno's paradox of mystery of motion to "agree" with quantum indeterminacy.

    My notes:
    In quantum physics, indeterministic qualities are challenged by the hidden variables principle. However, the current problem with hidden variables principle is that it seems to contradict currently well established principle on locality, in order to explain non-locality, which is well observed.

    prof: Kane - Libertarian. Rejects agent causation, accept event causation.

  8. btimlyg says:

    10/13/2015
    John Martin Fischer (Compatibilist): "Ought" implies "Can": Can moral obligations be conflicting with each other.
    Incompatible obligations as the origin of "tragedy"?

    Utilitarianism is a subset of Consequentialism. Human rights consequentialism is another subset of Consequentialism.

    Moral Responsibility: Backward looking justification. (opposite of utilitarianism morality)

    Retributivism: Purpose of punishment because they deserve it.
    Me: But humans can't work with retributivism without inviting vengeance.

    My research:
    Ought implies can, Kantian idea. Categorical freedom (bound only by free will), vs. Humean's hypothetical freedom (free to do otherwise IF I had so chosen). Source: wikipedia.

    Fischer could be considered semi-compatibilist (prof.: one-way compatibilist): Determinism compatible with moral responsibility, rejects Alternative Possibilities free will.
    Fischer allows "ought implies can" maxim, only if ought is NOT understood as "having sufficient reason to", for he thinks having sufficient reason to, does not imply can.
    This is the whole point of his essay. I think. Having sufficient reason does not imply can.
    To understand this further, one has to look into the Frankfurt cases, the basis Fischer defends.
    Frankfurt argues against AP in the 3 premises of Incompatibilism. Compatibilists generally reject premise #2 (Agent could have done otherwise if Determinism is false); while Frankfurt rejects premise #1 (Agent is responsible if he could have done otherwise).

    Frankfurt's take is similar to molinism. A god who knows all outcomes and intervened accordingly to achieve his goal yet his subjects do not realize it and thus they are responsible for their own actions.

  9. timlyg says:

    10/20/2015
    Vilhauer's paper:
    Prof's note: Kant is a kind of incompatibilist, according to how Prof read Kant.
    Kant's transcendental idealism = objective idealism, is necessary to make free will compatible with determinism. But we do not really know. Hence other philosophers (ie. Hudson, Meerbot) would argue Kant is compatibilist.

    Harry Frankfurt: Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
    Prof's note:
    Kant distinguishes between "practical freedom" and "transcendental freedom".
    Practical = autonomy (moral freedom): being treated & treating others as ends in ourselves.
    Transcendental = Free will - Kant says determinism is true but we still have libertarian free will.

    Kant: Ought implies can. Thus, freewill proven.
    Prof's order of complexity of theories (lowest to highest): physics->chemistry->biology->psychology. Close to Dr. Tong's.

  10. timlyg says:

    10/22/2015
    Frankfurt's claim - one-way compatibilism
    Cases like Larry show we can have FW/MR w/o alternative possibilities.
    Frankfurt thinks coercion is misleading. So one is responsible with or without coercion.

    Challenge to Frankfurt: is it really true that Larry has no meaningful alternatives?

    Hume: Everyone really argues that FW/MR is compatible with determinism, and we all admit determinism is true.
    - Luck argument - if our actions didn't flow from us deterministically, we wouldn't be MR.
    - Two-way compatibilism argument.
    - MR is based on an emotional reaction which our knowledge of determinism doesn't change.

    One more Hume point: if God is the ultimate cause of human actions, reason cannot deny that God is at fault.

  11. timlyg says:

    10/27/2015
    Prof.s Note:
    Hume -
    a). 2 way compatibilism (48)
    b). determinism is necessary for MR/FW (49)
    Objections Re: God: (will be discussed in next class - Strawson's reading)
    -----------------------
    c) determinism doesn't change our moral sentiments (52)
    and blame/resentment is just a sentiment.
    d) reason can't explain wy God isn't morally responsible for evil (52)

    Hume's analysis of "can"
    "Conditional analysis" of "can".
    I can do (x) so long as it's true that if I had chosen to do (x), I would have done (x).

    Wolf - Asymmetric Theory
    Alternate Possibilities are necessary for blame
    Alternate Possibilities are not necessary for praise.
    (For Wolf, this praise does not include accidental good deeds. It requires the determining good will, recognizing it's the right thing to do, must satisfy both freedom and value.)

    My notes:
    From the last few class discussions, it seems that there's a crucial difference people make about motive and intention. I looked it up, this is pertaining to judiciary jargon.
    Motive: happens before intent. Not an element of guilt.
    Intent: includes the action committed, therefore maybe culpable.

    Of course, Jesus talked about motive as a sin, not intent. What's in the mind can be considered an act of sin, even though it does not result physically. This does not include a mind exploring all possibilities, but the mind that succumbs to temptations though not bold enough or refuses to act outside of thoughts.

  12. timlyg says:

    10/29/2015
    Strawson - Compatibilist & Determinist.
    Similar to Wittgenstein. That the language/meanings in free will & determinism debate is the cause of confusion. e.g. morality & (determinism vs. free will) may be different things.
    Strawson's two separate systems: of physics (determinism), of morality.
    Reactive vs. objective attitudes.

    Prof.'s note:
    Strawson: Optimists (utilitarian compatibilists) vs. Pessimists.

  13. timlyg says:

    11/03/2015
    Prof:
    Strawson recommends the "reactive attitudes" (which involves praise and blame)
    1) Optimists use the "Objective Attitude", which Strawson equates with Utilitarianism.
    2) Pessimists say "objective attitude" destroys "real praise" & "real blame" & meaning of life
    3) Srawson agrees with pessimists about meaning of life but disagrees with pessimist metaphysics

    Terminology: Vicarious reactive attitude.

    I found a clear summary on Strawson. Another one that goes beyond Strawson.

    Sommers
    Hard deterministic, free-will skeptic/denier
    thinks objective attitude is good, doesn't destroy meaning of life.
    I get Sommers' brief here.

  14. timlyg says:

    11/05/2015
    Prof.:
    Stawson's notion of reactive attitude and withholding MR.

    Sommers leads to Atheism.

    Goodman: Buddhism = Hard determinism. Meditation of Buddhism against Strawson's problem with withholding resentment attitude. There is no ultimate reality. There is no thinking things, no cartesian ego, but there are ideas, thoughts.

  15. timlyg says:

    11/12/2015
    Quiz#2 reflection:
    Frankfurt's non-AP -> MR (one-way compatibilist) view, is close to Molina, but he does not confirm existence of God, hence we do not attribute AP to God for Frankfurt's view.

    David Lewis a strong supporter of Humean compatibilist.

  16. timlyg says:

    11/17/2015
    Libet's Question:
    Do our conscious decisions cause our actions?
    Libet: No.

    RP = readiness potential
    epiphenomenalism = the view of the mind discussed here.
    RP->Will->Veto function?->Action

  17. timlyg says:

    11/19/2015
    Derek Pereboom
    Hard Incompatilism (478)
    Non-Retributive Punishment (479)
    Meaning in Life (481)
    Falling in Love (486)
    Eliminating Moral Anger (488)

    Pereboom agrees with Kant that free will is possible; but Kant said: so we would vindicate it; Pereboom said we should reject it.

    Frankfurt: if no AP, cancel it; Pereboom: if no AP, we are the cause of MR.
    Pereboom: Either determinism or indeterminism takes away our free will.

  18. timlyg says:

    11/24/2015
    Smilansky: Fundamental Dualism

    My view:
    Recently at WSM, there's a lot talk about being non-judgemental. Smilanksy's Lazy Waiter case results in a good question: Is deciding tips not based on judgment? (more tip for those who deserve more)

  19. timlyg says:

    12/01/2015
    The People Problem by Benjamin Vilhauer
    - to defend free will deniers.
    - Advocate hard determinism
    Deterrence is mentioned to contrast with retributivism. Deterrence is to punish in a way to deter everyone (else) from offending.

    Retributivist/retributivism/retribution (not the same as vengeance, ret. is just):
    punishment is just because evildoers deserve to suffer.
    Desert requires moral responsibility, and moral responsibility requires free will.

    utilitarianism does not care about desert.

    Retributivism (Backward-looking) supports no kinds of consequentialism (Forward-looking).

    Prof: OT, Hammurabi laws => Kant's lex talionis.

    My summary:
    Prof's people problem: not treat people as if they have FW, but as ends.

  20. timlyg says:

    12/03/2015
    The People Problem &
    Taking Freewill Skepticism Seriously by Vilhauer
    - Remorse is more empathetic than a feeling of guilt
    - treat each other as ends, not mere means.
    It's ok to treat each other as means if we rationally consent
    because then we're not mere means.
    - Social Contract (Lockean) - John Rawls (economic inequalities).
    - "Original position deliberation", Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance"

  21. timlyg says:

    12/08/2015
    Final: Same room, 8AM. 12/15/2015

  22. timlyg says:

    12/10/2015
    Review:
    Libet - Self paced voluntary act (rotate their own wrists found readiness potential (RP)).
    RP is the first cause, unconscious, real start of action. This cannot be free. Only conscious action can be free will.
    Conscious minds can veto unconscious minds.

    John Rawls - Veil of ignorance puts us in Original position/deliberation. The only fair way to view social contract. Distributive justice.

    Smilansky - No free will, but it's better we think we do (illusion of free will) for morality's sake.
    How: Respect each other as people having rights, regard each other having free well. Try to be compatibilist though it is false. Tension comes when certain tragedy arrives.
    Dualism - accepts both compatibilism and incompatibilism.

    Pereboom - Hard incompatibilism. Neither determinism nor indeterminism is compatible with free will. Disagrees with Smilansky, better morality otherwise. On love, not from free will.
    Possible to have free will, but undetectable.
    No free will avoid moral anger -> retributive justice, which is bad.
    Agrees with Sommers: possible to suspend some reactive attitude, while preserving relationships. Strawson thinks we could only suspend Reactive Attitude for very short time.

    Vilhauer - People problem. If no system of law -> Hobbesean nature.
    Action-based vs. Person-based deserts.

  23. timlyg says:

    Ligonier Course:
    Sproul starts the course with Romans 8, the truth shall set you free
    Sproul mentioned F.B. Skinner's book: Beyond Freedom and Dignity
    where Skinner attempts to convince his readers that determinism is so true no reasons can help it ~ hence a contradictory irony.

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